Introduction
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to the investigation of driving forces and consequences of the far-reaching national administrative reforms and changes in the there is hardly any doubt that there is a converging trend away from classical Weberian bureaucracies towards more market-oriented management principles and structures. This process of international diffusion has to a considerable extent been fuelled by communication activities of international organizations, such as the OECD (Hood 1995; Laegreid 2002) .
In view of these developments, it is rather striking that management reforms within these international organizations themselves so far were hardly subject to comprehensive investigations. While considerable scientific attention was placed on analyzing the role of international organizations as arena for international cooperation, it is only recently that the role and functioning of international bureaucracies became a subject of growing importance (Barnett/Finnemore 1999 , 2004 Dijkzeul/Beigbeder 2003; Hooghe 2001; Reinalda/Verbeek 2004) . In this context, however, changes in management structures have only been addressed by few descriptive case studies (cf. Davies 2002; Dijkzeul 1997) . We hence have limited knowledge about the extent to which international organizations, often considered as crucial diffusion agents with regard to public sector management reforms, actually live up to the standards they promote. Moreover, we have limited theoretical understanding of the causes of corresponding reform developments in these organizations.
In this article, we address this research gap by an analysis of human resource management reforms in the OECD between 1996 and 2004. The period of investigation is determined by the term of office of Donald Johnston as OECD Secretary General (since 1996) and the data available. The OECD embarked on a major reform program of its human resource policies in 2005 (OECD 2006: 102f) . But this had not been completed at the time of this study and is therefore not covered in this article.
The OECD and its Public Management Committee (PUMA) 1 respectively are regarded as the hotbed of NPM (cf. Sahlin-Andersson 2002; Stone 2004) . But the extent to which the OECD actually lives up to the standard it promotes was not investigated so far. The most likely reason for this might be the fact that nobody really had any doubts that an organization acting as international reform promoter of NPM at the same time will long have introduced internal reforms along similar lines.
In view of this constellation, our finding that the OECD still represents a more
Weberian bureaucracy type when it comes to issues of human resource management indeed reflects a big surprise. It is in sharp contrast with the role of the OECD as one of the main promoters of NPM reforms in its member countries. From a methodological point of view, our case study hence reflects a 'most favorable cases design'. Starting out from a scenario in which a certain outcome is highly likely and plausible, we search for the factors that nevertheless caused the deviation from the expected result.
The paper is structured as follows: We first explain how we operationalized our dependent variable reform of human resource management (section 2). In a second step, we present our empirical findings and show why existing theoretical approaches are not sufficient to account for our empirical puzzle (section 3 and 4). Based on these reflections we consider in a third step alternative explanatory approaches and theoretical modifications of existing theories (section 5). The final section concludes.
1 PUMA was recently renamed into Public Governance and Territorial Development (GOV).
Reform of human resource management
The central focus of this paper is on the reform of human resource management in the OECD. We consider the change of formal rules concerning four categories, namely, recruitment, career structure, staff appraisal, and training (Davies 2002; Vaanholt 1997 ). We do not include personnel policy which is considered as the general framework of human resource management, e.g. social security, gender mainstreaming or pensions (Reichard 2005 
Empirical findings: The reform of human resource management in the OECD
The OECD staff regulations and rules apply to approximately 2,000 officials, most of whom are located in Paris. Besides, there are specific regulations and rules for around 300 short-term employees like consultants, trainees and auxiliaries, who however, are excluded from our analysis.
Starting with the dominant principles in recruitment, we find a solid correlation with NPM principles because the merit principle is the primary consideration. On top of this, the OECD tries to achieve an appropriate representation of member states ('geographical diversity') as well as ensure equal opportunity. As a general rule, vacant posts must be advertised and recruitment is through a competitive selection process. However, so-called project staff who is appointed for fixed terms to posts created to carry out approved projects, may be appointed directly without publication of a vacancy. As far as recruitment of the most senior staff is concernced, it is at the discretion of the Secretary-General. In early 2000 the OECD adopted a policy that all senior staff (Directors and Deputy-Directors) are appointed on fixed term contracts.
Even internal appointees who are promoted through an internal process have to relinquish their indefinite contracts if they had one. The OECD's job vacancy notices for senior staff emphasize both technical expertise and managerial skills.
Nevertheless, there is no regulation that makes solid management skills a condition sine qua non for management positions 2 . Since the introduction of activity-based management, senior managers are accountable and responsible for outputs that are laid down in the program of work and budget.
The career structure remained almost unchanged since the establishment of the OECD. Every position is open to competition so that lateral entrance into the structure is the normal case. This structure is composed of the categories A, L, B and C, each having again several seniority steps 3 . Category A is formed by professional staff (45 per cent), administrative and support staff is in category B, manual or technical staff is in category C and linguistic staff belongs to category L. In each category there are five to seven grades (A7, A6, A5…). Compared to our ex ante operationalized variables, this system is similar to a horizontal and quite impermeable Weberian structure that makes it difficult to reward performance. Since the introduction of result-oriented budgeting, it became, in the opinion of some member states, increasingly difficult to deploy staff in a flexible way, i.e. to shift them from one priority task to another 4 . Some member states even think that the actual system bars the OECD from attracting and recruiting the specialists it needs 5 . The basic salary is dependent on the grade and not (necessarily) on the task or responsibility a person has and OECD officials receive automatic extra pay by seniority steps. It is provided that advancement may be withheld for a fixed period of time in cases of lack of efficiency of an official. Senior staff members (grade A7 and A6) have six to eight possible steps, the other grades ten to eleven. The higher a person gets, the more the extra pay increases. In connection with the basic salary, this leads to an overlapping of grades so that a newly appointed superior can theoretically earn less than a long-serving subordinate. The seniority principle is therefore quite important; performance-related pay does not exist. However, it is possible that the Secretary General awards an official with one or more extra seniority steps in return for his particular efforts (gratification). 
Explaining the empirical puzzle: The limits of Isomorphism Theory
As administrative reforms in international organizations so far were hardly subject to systematic analysis, there is no specific theoretical background on which possible explanations for our empirical findings could be based. This does not mean, however, that we have to start from zero when searching for appropriate theories. In view of the underlying research question, institutional isomorphism emerged as a common and promising framework in order to account for phenomena of international spreading and diffusion of policy innovations and reform concepts, not least with regard to public sector reforms (DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Meyer/Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1997; Levi-Faur 2003) . The central argument advanced by DiMaggio and Powell is that legitimacy rather than efficiency is the major driving force of Hence, organizational change is essentially driven by external developments rather than intra-organizational concerns about the organization's efficiency. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three mechanisms which are driving isomorphic organizational change, namely coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. In the following, these mechanisms will be investigated in closer detail.
Coercive isomorphism
An important driving force of isomorphic organizational change emerges from coercion. Organizations adjust their structures and procedures to organizations on which they are financially or legally dependent. According to these considerations, DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 74) hypothesize that 'the greater the dependence of an organization on another organization, the more similar it will become to that organization in structure, climate, and behavioural focus'.
Looking at our case, this kind of dependence might especially result from potential pressures exerted by the member states. The member states could, on principle, exert financial and political pressure for adjusting existing management structures, as they play a crucial rule in defining the budget of the OECD. To account for this variance, we divide the member states of the OECD into two groups of NPM core countries and NPM laggards and measure the number of votes each group has in the Council as well as its respective budget contribution. In this context, we assume that no significant changes in the classification of the member states occurred during the observation period 1996 to 2004. This assumption is supported by comparing respective assessments in the literature.
The following table illustrates our classification of member states (Hood 1995; Kim 2002; OECD 1995 The dependence with regard to introducing NPM-based human resource management structures is assumed to vary with three factors:
First, the budgetary contributions might vary across member states. In view of our research question it is of particular importance whether member states that can be characterized as NPM core countries or member states that are laggards in introducing NPM reforms at home are more influential in terms of political decisions and budgetary contributions.
Second, the budgetary pressures exerted by the member states might increase with the size of the personnel budget in relation to the overall budget. Third, pressures on the personnel budget might be reduced, the more an organization disposes of own resources that cannot be influenced by the member states.
The empirical analyis shows that NPM core countries (the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom) pay for almost a third of the OECD budget and represent one third of the Council votes. In addition, with a rate of only 7.3 % own resources (e.g. sale of publications), the financial dependence of the OECD on its member states is very high. Finally, the relative size of the personnel budget makes up almost half the size of the overall budget. This means that an effective and efficient human resource management should have been of prime importance.
In sum, one could at first glance certainly argue that from the perspective of coercive isomorphism, we already find a sound explanation for the lack of management reforms in the OECD. As the laggard members are slightly better represented in terms of budget contributions and voting power, the only incremental moves towards NPM should come as no surprise. This picture, however, is strongly modified when looking at other organisations, such as, for instance the European Commission. In the European Union, the laggards are even more represented than in the OECD.
Nevertheless, the Commission enacted rather far-reaching reforms with a stronger orientation of its human resource management towards NPM models than the OECD (Knill/Balint 2008 Obviously, from a comparative perspective, the OECD is already characterized by a rather strong representation of NPM leader states. The lack of respective reforms hence cannot be sufficiently accounted for from the perspective of coercive isomorphism.
Mimetic isomorphism
Organizational adjustment to the environment is not only expected to take in place as When examining the empirical results more closely, we arrive at the conclusion that mimetic isomorphism should be quite likely in the OECD. This becomes firstly apparent by the fact that the budget is based on yearly and (from 2007 onwards)
biannual decisions of the Council. Secondly, the size of the yearly budget and personnel resources within the OECD decreased significantly from the late 1990s onwards.
Between 1996 and 1999, the member states decided to cut the OECD budget by 18
per cent (taking account of inflation), implying that the OECD had to cut 220 jobs (OECD 1997a: 93; OECD 1999: 32) . In light of these developments, we should have expected a much more wide-ranging reform in the OECD. Mimetic isomorphism hence also provides no sufficient explanation for the surprising absence of NPM reforms within the OECD.
Normative Isomorphism
A further mechanism driving isomorphic organizational change is based on similar dominant normative orientations and beliefs of staff members. In this context, especially the impact of similar professional backgrounds and the role of professional organizations and epistemic communities (Haas 1992) in spreading common understandings and perceptions of policy problems and solutions are emphasized in the literature (Hasse/Krücken 2005: 26) .
In terms of professional standards (education, academic background), the OECD staff is recruited amongst the best-educated academics (Spescha 2005). We therefore consider it more appropriate to focus on the home country of the staff 10 Interview, 17 March 2006. members rather than on their educational background. This focus is also used by other studies, such as Hooghe (2001) . In her study of decision-making within the European Commission, she found that the Commission bureaucrats generally define their respective positions by taking account of the 'majority opinion' in their home countries. For our concrete case of human resource management, we should hence expect the support of staff members for NPM-oriented reforms to depend on the extent to which such developments were adopted or are supported in their home countries. The higher the number of staff from NPM core countries, the more the organization will adopt NPM-based reforms.
This argument, however, needs further specification. First, it can be assumed that the extent to which staff members perceive themselves as associated with dominant beliefs and positions of 'their' national context decreases over time. The longer the tenure of officials, the more the socialization with the orientations and goals of the international organization will become dominant over their domestic socialization (cf. states, while at the same time keeping rather 'old-fashioned structures' at home.
In summary, we find that the different mechanisms of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism provide no convincing explanation in order to account for the reform efforts of the OECD. The central puzzle hence emerging from our analysis is why the OECD did not embrace to a considerable and even stronger extent NPMbased human resource management?
We argue in the following that this puzzle can be addressed by closer investigating the limits of mechanisms of institutional isomorphism.
Scope Conditions of Isomorphic Change
It is an important achievement of isomorphism theory to differentiate between various mechanisms that drive organizational change. Moreover, the theory identifies the factors that affect the relative importance of each mechanism in a specific constellation; e.g., coercive isomorphism is more pronounced, the more an organization is dependent from other organizations.
What is theoretically underdeveloped, however, is the fact that -in many instancesorganizations will have multiple choices when striving for increasing their legitimacy in their organizational environment. On the one hand, there might be more than one dominant model that could serve as a blueprint for change. On the other hand, and this is of special importance in our case, isomorphic change might refer to different dimensions, levels or aspects of existing organizational structures, routines and practices. In other words, it is unclear under which conditions an organizations decides to reform, for instance, its formal structure, its decision-making procedures or its human resource management. Which parts of the menu of potentially legitimacyenhancing reform models circulating in the international environment do organizations actually select and why?
We argue in the following that organizations base these decisions upon the relative legitimacy gains to be derived from the varying options for isomorphic change. The case of the OECD shows that these potential gains are strongly affected by the specific legitimacy problems an organization is confronted with. Given the OECD's rather fundamental crisis with regard to its very self-identity and future development, isomorphic adjustments of its human resource management were no sufficient remedy to overcome this crisis. Concerning management reforms, he states that 'before you start hiring more people and spending more money, you need to ask: is everything you are doing today relevant?'
Conflicts on future goals are highly difficult to resolve in view of internal decisionmaking structures based on unanimity. This holds true in particular, as the adoption of new goals in light of the tight budgetary situation would require reducing other activities. Such redistribution conflicts, however, are difficult to address within the existing structures (Chavranski 1997: 71 further aggravated by the fact that in the general public, there is a decreasing perception and knowledge of the activities and the achievements of the OECD. For instance, in most member states, the general public is not aware of the fact that the highly politicized PISA ranking was launched by the OECD.
In sum, the central problem of the OECD is hence to legitimize its very existence and its objectives towards its organization environment 14 . In view of these fundamental challenges, isomorphic adjustments of its human resource management to models highly valued in its environment provided no significant legitimacy gains or remedies to overcome these challenges.
These considerations suggest that organizations are highly selective in terms of how to react to pressures for isomorphic change. The effectiveness of respective mechanisms depends on the specific problems with which an organization is confronted and the relative importance of isomorphic changes for overcoming these problems. 
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the extent to which the OECD reformed its human resource management in line with NPM principles. In sum, only staff appraisal and recruitment were reformed, whereas the career structure remains an old-fashioned model. The budget and hours of training given by official have even declined and have reached a very low level. Our finding is striking from the perspective of theories of institutional isomorphism, as both coercive, mimetic and normative pressures for NPM-based adjustments were quite strong for the OECD, predicting that we should actually observe big reform efforts. The fact that our findings actually reveal the opposite pattern is basically the result of restrictions to the effectiveness of isomorphic change that apply in the case of the OECD. Rather our analysis suggests that the extent to which isomorphic mechanisms operate or not is subject to additional conditions so far not sufficiently specified in the theory. In particular, it seems to be the case that organizations are highly selective in deciding upon which type of policy innovations diffusing internationally they adopt. Our case indicates that relative benefits to be obtained from isomorphic adjustments for overcoming existing problems are of crucial importance.
